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Stalin Best WWII Content DS Siege Leningrad, Op. Barbarossa, He Defends Moscow, Incredible!
Stalin Best WWII Content DS Siege Leningrad, Op. Barbarossa, He Defends Moscow, Incredible!
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Description:

Josef Stalin
Moscow, September 15, 1941
Stalin Best WWII Content DS Siege Leningrad, Op. Barbarossa, He Defends Moscow, Incredible!
DS
Incredible and very rare typed document signed in which Stalin orders the raising of the Red Army to protect Moscow, just one week after Germany's Siege of Leningrad as part of Operation Barbarossa, Moscow, September 15, 1941. Boldly signed by Stalin in blue pencil at bottom of second page, with corrections in another hand. Two pages, 8" x 11.5". Marked "Secret" at top and in overall very good condition with just a rough left edge.

World War II-date signed documents by Stalin are very rare, and while we have handled other examples, this document is indisputably the best!

Titled "ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR No. 0355," it reads, in part:

"Based on the Resolution of the State Defense Committee dated September 15, 1941 No. GKO-675 I ORDER:

1. To call up into the ranks of the Red Army military conscripts of the first category of reserve privates and junior command personnel, up to the age of 37, from among those enjoying deferments from conscription for mobilization in enterprises and institutions in quantities according to the percentage norms specified in the attached calculation.

2. In the period from September 18 to October 15, 1941, to call up into the ranks of the Red Army and the Navy citizens born in 1922.

3. The following persons are not subject to conscription under paragraph 1: rank-and-file and junior commanding officers in the reserve holding the following positions:
a) heads of enterprises and institutions, engineering and technical workers in production, foremen and skilled workers of the sixth rank and above;
b) all workers of the fifth rank and above directly engaged in the production of aircraft, tanks, engines and all types of small arms and artillery weapons and ammunition.
c) teachers of higher educational institutions, research institutes and scientific workers; scientific and technical workers;
d) underground workers of mines producing coking and gas coal, cutting machine operators, miners and igniters;
e) locomotive engineers, their assistants, locomotive stokers and traffic and communications service dispatchers.

4. Conscription of reserve military personnel of the 1st category from among those working in the NKVD bodies /police, armed guards, GULAG, etc./ to be carried out in two terms by October 15 and November 15, 1941, 50% in each term.

5. The selection of those called up under paragraph 1 of the order from among those enjoying deferments from conscription for mobilization shall be carried out by commissions consisting of: the district/city/military commissar, a representative of the local party committee and the head of the relevant enterprise/institution/.

6. The Military Councils of the districts shall, within two months, replace all reservists liable for military service called up under this order from the police, paramilitary, armed guards, the GULAG and other NKVD institutions - reservists liable for military service, privates and junior command personnel, aged from 40 to 50 years.

7. All reservists and conscripts called up under this order are to be fully deployed to staffing rifle and cavalry divisions, airborne units, tank brigades, spare parts and other formations.

8. All work under this order, with the exception of paragraphs 4 and 6, is to be completed by October 15 of this year…".

Russia may have signed the Molotov-von Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 with Germany and with it made the promise of non-aggression, but December 1940, all bets were off. Six months later, Hitler officially broke the cynical treaty and invaded Russia in Operation Barbarossa, launched on June 14, 1941. The goal, in simplified form, was overthrow Stalin's "Jewish-Boshevist" regime, decimate the Slavic peoples, and repopulate the region with Germans. Other objectives centered around the seizing oil fields, agriculture, and other resources necessary to increase the Nazi ideal of "lebensraum."
However, Barbarossa's epic failure as an offense indicated that Hitler vastly underestimated the Soviets' considerable industrial capacity and military leadership, much less the country's ability to fight under weather conditions that would ultimately paralyze the German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe in the winter of 1941. Stalin's Red Army also had the upper hand in the form of sheer quantity of troops: fighting a battle of attrition, it had literally millions in reserve to replace troops as quickly as the Wehrmacht depleted them, leaving the Germans under-resourced, undermanned, and exhausted.
Finally, the German loss also points to the flawed logic of Nazism and its reliance on the eradication of the enemy (in this case Communism) rather than the expansion of actual territory.
Stalin, in our document and anticipating an attack on Moscow as part of Barbarossa, orders the conscription of all privates and junior commanders - up to the age of 37 - as well as necessary ancillary workers to deal with war machinery and logistics. Those with paramilitary experience such as police, security guards, and other secret police institutions were also conscripted - up to an even more incredible age of 50. Of note is the fact that Stalin gathered individuals not only from the "general population," but those condemned to the GULAG, which interned not only political prisoners but criminals. By 1940, the GULAG held some 1.5 million individuals, forming an impressive reserve force in and of itself.
Two months after he initiated Barbarossa, Hitler ordered the Siege of Leningrad on September 8, 1941, the longest and costliest in military history. After encircling Leningrad, Hitler turned his attention to Moscow. A swift and early capture of Moscow would have had immense psychological impact, and could have been the tipping point of the invasion. However, Hitler had decreed "Leningrad first, the Donetsk Basin [eastern Ukraine] second, Moscow third." The objectives were the capture of Minsk, Smolensk and then Moscow itself, and he systematically dwelled on the destruction of the Red Army armies and capturing vital industrial resources rather than the areas of country itself -- despite the advice of his senior officers, who believed the victory could be achieved only through the destruction of Moscow.
The Donetsk Basin (Dombas Operation) was launched and simultaneously the push to Moscow (Operation Typhoon) would begin on September 30, 1941, and thus two weeks after our document. Hitler anticipated 10 weeks to finish the job; instead Typhoon and with it, Barbarossa, would not end until January 1942.
Hitler's early Panzer attacks on Moscow left the city's line of defense shattered, and German victory seemed secure. However, despite the initial setbacks, bad Soviet weather stunted the drive of the Wehrmacht. The Soviets took advantage of Germany's need to repeatedly halt the offensive and were able to bring in quantities of supplies and reinforcements such as the ones mentioned in our document. The sheer mass of manpower alone would wear down the Germans: the Red Army had some 3-5.5 million active troops and some 14 million reserves at hand.
Furthermore, the Wehrmacht was unprepared for the difficulty in traversing the muddy terrain left by autumn rains, followed by frozen roads and temperatures as low as -44 Fahrenheit. Panzer tanks' fuel and lubrication froze and the Luftwaffe was virtually grounded. German soldiers, ill-prepared for the cold, froze in their summer uniforms, and died of illness and frostbite. The size of the Soviet terrain was unexpected; failure on the part of German intelligence and poor logistics also spelled more problems for the Germans, who scrambled to make timely deliveries of fuel and ammunition in the vastness of the country.
By late October, the German forces were worn out and by late November, the offensive was stopped. German General Hans Guderian wrote in his journal that "the offensive on Moscow failed ... We underestimated the enemy's strength, as well as his size and climate. Fortunately, I stopped my troops on 5 December, otherwise the catastrophe would be unavoidable."
With the failure of Barbarossa, the tide was thus turned against Hitler. This can be evinced by the sheer numbers: in June 1941, the Heer as a whole had 209 divisions at its disposal, 163 of which were offensively capable. By March 1942 and thus less than one year after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the army was reduced to fielding 58 offensively capable divisions.
This item comes with a Certificate from John Reznikoff, a premier authenticator for both major 3rd party authentication services, PSA and JSA (James Spence Authentications), as well as numerous auction houses.

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  • Dimensions: 8" x 11.5"
  • Medium: DS

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