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Richard Nixon: "I thought you might like to see some unconventional wisdom on Gorbachev"
Richard Nixon: "I thought you might like to see some unconventional wisdom on Gorbachev"
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Description:

Nixon Richard



Richard Nixon: “I thought you might like to see some unconventional wisdom on Gorbachev"

 

1p TLS initialed by former 37th U.S. President Richard Nixon (1913-1994) as “RN” at center. Written on “Office of Richard Nixon” 5” x 8” cream note paper on December 13, 1990. Accompanied by the transcript of a speech originally enclosed. Minor rusted paperclip impressions found on the note paper letterhead, and on the back of the last page of the speech, and a few wrinkles, else near fine.

 

In mid-December 1990, Nixon sent journalist Adrian Lee a signed note that read: “I thought you might like to see some unconventional wisdom on Gorbachev, the Gulf and other current foreign policy issues. Regards. RN.” Adrien Lee was a longtime columnist for Philadelphia's Evening Bulletin, a daily newspaper that folded in 1982.

 

Nixon had shared some of his many ideas about current American foreign policy at a meeting of the National Republican Congressional Committee at the Plaza Hotel in New York City less than a week before, on December 7, 1990, the 49th anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor and American entry into World War II. In an 18pp speech entitled “A War About Peace,” Nixon weighed in on foreign policy issues confronting the George H.W. Bush administration. These included the state of the Soviet Union, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In the speech, Nixon argued that the United States needed to be tough and stay involved in international politics to prevent future conflict, secure American interests, and serve as a role model for democracies everywhere. This speech was timely, as the Bush administration was deliberating what to do about the recent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

 

On left-leaning Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, Nixon cautioned Americans not to completely trust him or his policies. Nixon anticipated the dissolution of the Soviet Union that would occur two years later in 1991, but he was uncertain about what role Gorbachev would continue to play in Soviet politics.

 

In part: “Let us take a hard look at the Soviet Union after six years of Gorbachev’s leadership. His political reforms have been revolutionary. Where there was no freedom of the press, there is now some. Where there was no freedom to criticize Soviet leaders, there is now some. Where there were no free elections, there are now some. But we must bear in mind that while Gorbachev deserves great credit for these reforms, he has also put through legislation which makes him the most powerful Soviet leader since Stalin. All of the evidence points to the conclusion that his goal is not to abandon communism but to save it, not to dismantle the Soviet Union but to preserve it peacefully – if possible but using force if necessary…” (“A War About Peace,” 5)

 

On the role of the American military in Europe and Asia, Nixon urged Americans to stay the course. While recent events seemed to suggest an end to the Cold War, Nixon advised intensified vigilance.  If American troops withdrew from Europe, the region would be exposed to potential aggression from a fully armed Soviet Union. If American troops withdrew from Asia, Japan would expand its nuclear program and harass neighbors that already hated them because of World War II.

 

In part: “But what would Europe be without an American military presence? Great Britain and France are minor nuclear powers. Germany is an economic superpower without nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union even without Eastern Europe will still be a nuclear superpower with the world’s largest conventional army. No one can seriously suggest that the British and French would use their nuclear forces to deter a Soviet attach on Germany. With United States forces gone from Europe and NATO dissolved, Germany would have the option of going nuclear or neutral and would be strongly tempted to become a political and economic ally of the Soviet Union. Either of these options is bad for Europe, bad for Germany, bad for the United States…” (“A War About Peace,” 9)

 

Last, and most importantly, Nixon advocated for military intervention in the Middle East. He posited that the regime of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein would not respond to economic sanctions or diplomatic overtures, just swift American military action.

 

In part: “It is time for some straight talk as to why 400,000 young Americans are spending Christmas in the deserts of Saudi Arabia…Saddam Hussein has unlimited ambitions to dominate one of the most important strategic areas in the world. Because he has oil, he has the means to acquire the weapons he needs for aggression against his neighbors, including at some future time, a nuclear arsenal. If he succeeds in Kuwait, he will attack others and will use whatever weapons he has including chemical and nuclear to achieve his goals. If we don’t stop him now we will have to stop him later when the cost in the lives of young Americans will be infinitely greater…our diplomats should always remember that where an insatiable aggressor is involved, while war is bad, a bad peace is worse because it can lead to a bigger war…If we have to resort to force, it will not be just a war about oil. It will not be a war about hostages. It will not be a war about democracy. It will be a war about peace – not just peace in our time but peace for our children and grandchildren for generations to come…” (“A War About Peace,” 11-14)

 

Many of the ideas advanced in Nixon’s “A War About Peace” speech further demonstrate how Nixon, a diehard lifelong Republican, viewed the world. Nixon maintained that while Americans were not the world’s “policemen,” they still performed an essential role in keeping world peace. The United States was exceptional in its ability to provide moral leadership and preserve the status quo. It was an exemplar to the rest of the world, one that was still a very dangerous place. While Communism appeared to be contained, the United States needed to remain vigilant, because no one else could or would do it.

 

Nixon mailed the transcript of “A War About Peace” to 300 commentators and critics following the convention. (Did Nixon consider Adrien Lee one of the influencers of the day?) Two weeks after delivering the speech, Nixon sent a 9pp gloss of its major ideas to President Bush. The December 25, 1990 letter began, “Because I know you must be deluged by unsolicited advice on how to handle the crisis in the Gulf, I hesitate to add to your voluminous reading material. Nevertheless, I am enclosing a memorandum I wrote on Christmas Day. I hope you might find it useful. But in any event, whether you follow my advice or not, you can be sure that I will unqualifiably [sic] support whatever decision you make…”

 

The Bush administration launched Operation Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait on January 15, 1991. Hussein’s forces were forced out before two months had elapsed.

 

The National Republican Congressional Committee’s mission statement, as stated on their website, is: “It supports the election of Republicans to the House through direct financial contributions to candidates and Republican Party organizations; technical and research assistance to Republican candidates and Party organizations; voter registration, education, and turn-out programs; and other Party-building activities.”

 

Nixon had been out of public office for over 14 years in December 1990. Yet, as we know from this note and speech, he was still very active in current affairs. The ex-president devoted himself to writing, traveling, and speaking engagements in the years following his resignation. Nixon’s repentance about past mistakes, as well as his later political involvement, did much to rehabilitate his tarnished public image.



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